Exploring the Path - Pāli Course

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī applies the same method as with the wholesome mental concomitants¹ in the chapter on the ‘twelve unwholesome mental states’ (dvādasa akusalacittani). It starts likewise with the same opening question:

Katame dhammā akusalā?

Yasmiṃ samaye akusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti somanassasahagataṃ diṭṭhigatasampayuttaṃ …

When at a particular moment a certain mental state has arisen that is accompanied by delightful feeling and associated with wrong view …

This analogous approach to the dhammā kusalā then lists all the twelve dhammā akusalā which enable a closer examination. Beginning with the eight mental states based on the unwholesome root of lobha, it proceeds with the two based on dosa and concludes with the factors that accompany the two cittāni based on moha.² Thus there are overall fourteen mental factors that occur only in an unwholesome citta.³

Closer investigation will reveal that various cetasikā appear and accompany both mental states, wholesome and unwholesome as well, and also different types of consciousness. Again it will be found that the first six of those seven universal cetasikā are preceding all other mental concomitants in both categories of citta — thus they are called ‘universals’. This description is presented in the side-by-side table to this lesson which lists all the mental concomitants for the twelve unwholesome consciousnesses.

The Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho provides a different way of analyses and itemizes in all fifty-two different cetasikā each of which has its specific character and function:

Terasaññasamānā⁴ ca, cuddasākusalā tathā;

Sobhanā pañcavīsāti, dvipaññāsa pavuccare.⁵

With thirteen that are alterable, and fourteen that are unwholesome,

With twenty-five that are beautiful, thus fifty-two have been itemized.

Here the first category is the group of mental factors called ‘ethically variable or alterable’ (sabbacittasādhāraṇā).⁶ These can appear in both an unwholesome and wholesome citta. These variable concomitants then take on the respective character of the particular state of mind. This group consists of seven, called ‘universals’ (aññasamānā)⁷ because they appear in every citta,⁸ and six ‘occasionals’ (pakiṇṇakā)⁹, which don’t accompany each and every citta.¹⁰ 

It can be seen that there is a difference between the number and grouping in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī with fifty-six cetasikā and the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho, which describes altogether only fifty-two cetasikā. The commentary explains that even though there seems to be an apparent different enumeration, there is actually no dissimilarity, highlighting that some of the fifty-six cetasikā are mentioned under a different name. Some mental concomitants are highlighted twice (i.e., saddha as saddhindriya; similar hirī as hirībala), sometimes even three times (i.e., saddha, saddhindriya and saddhābala), or even four times (i.e., sati as sati, satindriya, satibala and sammasati).

It should further be noted that in general not all cetasikā go along with each citta, but the same mental factors can take on different characters responding to the different qualities of the citta they accompany. Thus, for example, the cetasika ‘volition’ (cetanā) can take on unwholesome character when going along with a mental state of evil character but likewise take on wholesome character in a mental state that intends to perform good actions.¹¹

It can be seen from the last two lessons that mind — with its eighty-nine or one-hundred-twenty-one different states of consciousness, with the respective accompanying mental factors that change their character and identity by adapting to the quality of the citta they attend — is a perpetually ongoing, flowing stream of consciousness. Even so, an experiential confirmation for such mental details may be difficult to be realized even by an established meditator. The Abhidhamma corroborates with such analytical and dissecting scrutiny that mind is clearly just an illusion in itself — just in case it is considered having a ‘permanent identity of I, me or myself’!

King Milinda asked the Venerable Nāgasena¹² whether it would be possible to experience and understand the cetasikā.

Rājā āha bhante nāgasena, sakkā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ ekatobhāvagatānaṃ¹³ vinibbhujitvā¹⁴ vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ ‘ayaṃ phasso, ayaṃ vedanā, ayaṃ saññā, ayaṃ cetanā, idaṃ viññāṇaṃ, ayaṃ vitakko, ayaṃ vicāro’ti?¹⁵

The king said: Bhante Nāgasena, considering those specified conditions with their nature to arise together, is it possible, by separating them and turning them inside out to make the distinction between them clear, so that one could say: ‘This is contact, this sensation, this perception, this volition, and this consciousness, this application, and this is investigation’?

Venerable Nāgasena clearly disagreed:

Na sakkā, mahārāja, imesaṃ dhammānaṃ ekatobhāvagatānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ ‘ayaṃ phasso, ayaṃ vedanā, ayaṃ saññā, ayaṃ cetanā, idaṃ viññāṇaṃ, ayaṃ vitakko, ayaṃ vicāro’ti

No, indeed, Great King, considering those specified conditions with their nature to arise together, is it not possible to separate them and turn them inside out to make the distinction between them clear, so that one could say: ‘This is contact, this sensation, this perception, this volition, and this consciousness, this application, and this is investigation’?

Then when asked for a simile, Venerable Nāgasena gave the example of a royal cook who was to prepare a soup and put curd, salt, ginger, cumin seed, pepper and other ingredients in it. If the king was then to request the cook to specifically select any one of those ingredients that were already added to the soup, would that be possible? Would anyone be able to pick out each one, so that one could say: ‘Here is the sourness, and here the saltiness, and here the spiciness, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness’?

Yathā, mahārāja, rañño sūdo arasaṃ vā rasaṃ vā kareyya, so tattha dadhimpi¹⁶ pakkhipeyya,¹⁷ loṇampi pakkhipeyya, siṅgiverampi pakkhipeyya, jīrakampi pakkhipeyya, maricampi pakkhipeyya, aññānipi pakārāni pakkhipeyya, tamenaṃ rājā evaṃ vadeyya, ‘dadhissa me rasaṃ āhara, loṇassa me rasaṃ āhara, siṅgiverassa me rasaṃ āhara, jīrakassa me rasaṃ āhara, maricassa me rasaṃ āhara, sabbesaṃ me pakkhittānaṃ rasaṃ āharā’ti. Sakkā nu kho, mahārāja, tesaṃ rasānaṃ ekatobhāvagatānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā rasaṃ āharituṃ ambilattaṃ vā lavaṇattaṃ vā tittakattaṃ vā kaṭukattaṃ vā kasāyattaṃ vā madhurattaṃ vā’ti?

Clearly the king had to agree that such differentiation was impossible, and he fully consented when Venerable Nāgasena stated that in the very same way it would be impossible to differentiate any of the cetasikā from the other.

Evameva kho, mahārāja, na sakkā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ ekatobhāvagatānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ ‘ayaṃ phasso, ayaṃ vedanā, ayaṃ saññā, ayaṃ cetanā, idaṃ viññāṇaṃ, ayaṃ vitakko, ayaṃ vicāro’ti, api ca kho pana sakena sakena lakkhaṇena upaṭṭhahantī’ti.